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Taxonomy of Minority Governments
LISA LA FORNARA
INTRODUCTION
A minority government in its most basic form is a government in which the party holding
the most parliamentary seats still has fewer than half the seats in parliament and therefore cannot
pass legislation or advance policy without support from unaffiliated parties.1 Because seats in
minority parliaments are more evenly distributed amongst multiple parties, opposition parties have
greater opportunity to block legislation. A minority government must therefore negotiate with
external parties and adjust its policies to garner the majority of votes required to advance its
initiatives.2
This paper serves as a taxonomy of minority governments in recent history and proceeds
in three parts. First, it provides a working definition of minority governments, explains the
different types of minority governments, and identifies how minority governments relate to
coalition governments. Second, the paper explores the ways minority governments form, including
the various ways they take power and the types of electoral systems likely to produce them. Finally,
the paper examines the relationship between minority governments and constitutional design,
primarily focusing on the role of first past the post and proportional representation electoral
systems and semi-presidential executive systems. Ultimately, this taxonomy asserts that a
democractic instability is neither a cause nor an effect of the formation of minority governments:



Juris Doctor Candidate, 2018, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, 2015, Canisius
College. I am endlessly thankful to Professors Susan and David Williams for their inspiration and guidance in the
production of this Note.
1
D. Kwavnick & Stephen Azzi, Minority Government, CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/minority-government/ (last updated Oct. 23, 2015).
2
See R.G., How Minority Government Works, ECONOMIST: ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (May 6, 2015, 11:50 PM),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/05/economist-explains-7; Jonathan Boston & Andrew
Ladley, Efficient Secrets: The Craft of Coalition Management, 4 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 55, 69 (2006).
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minority governments are not a sign of democratic failure and do not threaten a country’s
democratic performance.
I. GENERAL INFORMATION
The separation of powers between various government branches is often cited as a key
protector of democracy against authoritarian rule. One such crucial partition is the constitutional
separation of authority between the executive and legislative branches, with contemporary
democracies adhering to either a presidential or parliamentary system. 3 Presidential systems
maintain a strict separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, with each
branch holding the other accountable in its entirety. In contrast, parliamentary systems are unified
or fused systems in which the chief executive is elected by and accountable to the legislature.4 The
chief executive, often called the prime minister, has the authority to dissolve the legislature and
call an election;5 in such circumstances, however, the prime minister is also ousted from office.6
For a legislature to effectively perform its constitutional functions, it must be able to
consistently muster legislative majorities in support of legislation, budgetary bills, and official
appointments.7 Maintaining a legislative majority is especially important to parliamentary
legislatures, which are vulnerable to motions of no confidence and can lose control of the prime
ministership. Elections do not always produce strict party majorities; therefore, after such
elections, parliamentary parties may join together to form a majority coalition. In some

3

For a full explanation of the differences between presidential and parliamentary systems with regard to the
separation of powers, electoral design, and legislative efficiency, see Richard Albert, The Fusion of Presidentialism
and Parliamentarism, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 531 (2009).
4
KAARE STRØM, MINORITY GOVERNMENT AND MAJORITY RULE, 3–4 (1990).
5
Michael Laver, Legislatures or Parliaments in Comparative Contexts?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 121, 124 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald Wittman eds., 2008).
6
General elections are held after a parliament is dissolved and all selected representatives must form a new
government. See Dissolution of Parliament, INTERNATIONAL IDEA 2, 4 (May 2016),
http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/dissolution_of_parliament_final.pdf.
7
STRØM, supra note 4, at 5.
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circumstances, however, a plurality party or group of parties may opt to proceed as a relative
majority, thereby forming a minority government.8
A minority government differs from a majority coalition government because, unlike
traditional coalition governments where two or more parties formally join together, outside parties
in minority governments may support the plurality party while retaining their independence.9 Thus,
the government remains a minority for the duration of its tenure10 and must rely on other parties
to pass intended legislation.11 These two concepts are not mutually exclusive and it is possible for
a government to be controlled by a minority coalition. In such cases, minority parties create a
formal coalition but still hold fewer than half of the parliamentary seats.12 Interestingly, the
governing minority coalition does not always contain the party that holds an individual plurality.
Rather, the process allows for like-minded, small parties to displace larger or plurality parties and
take control of the government.13

8

In most parliamentary democracies, minority governments are less common than majority governments but
nowhere near as rare as nonpartisan governments, in which “cabinet members do not act as party representatives
(even though they may hold party memberships). . .” Id. at 7. In fact, several studies have shown that approximately
one-third of post-war governments have held minority status. Id. at 8.
9
Jon Stone, What is a Minority Government? How is it Different to a Coalition?, INDEPENDENT (May 7, 2015, 3:54
PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/minority-government-coalitions-primeminister-government-snp-labour-conservative-lib-dem-10232801.html.
10
In these systems, any party or coalition of parties—regardless of whether the party or coalition constitutes a
minority or a majority of the legislature—can take power so long as the proposed government passes an investiture
vote. For a discussion on how investiture rules affect the formation of minority governments, see discussion infra
Section II.A.
11
See Boston & Ladley, supra note 2, at 89. Minority governments can occur absent special rules permitting them.
Israel is an exception in that it does not permit traditional minority coalitions to govern. To be recognized absent an
absolute majority, a party must either be part of an oversized coalition or a minimal winning coalition. An oversized
coalition exists where two or more parties’ strength exceeds the number necessary for a parliamentary majority. The
defining feature of an oversized coalition is that, if one of the partners leaves the coalition, the coalition does not
lose its status as the majority government. A minimal winning coalition is made up of parties whose combined
strength ensures more than half of parliament. In a minimal winning coalition, a partner’s withdrawal from the
coalition destroys the coalition’s majority. Ofer Kenig, Coalition Building in Israel: A Guide for the Perplexed, ISR.
DEMOCRACY INST. (Feb. 18, 2013), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/10248.
12
See generally André Kaiser, MMP, Minority Governments and Parliamentary Opposition, 7 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L.
L. 77 (2009) (identifying potential factors to explain why New Zealand has been governed by multiple minority
coalition governments).
13
Minority coalitions have held power in countries such as Ireland, Denmark, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.
See infra Appendix, pp. 37, 40–41, 43–46, 53–54.
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A. Types of Minority Governments
In addition to single-party minority governments and minority coalitions, there are two
primary types of minority governments: substantive minority governments and formal minority
governments. A substantive minority government is supported by a pre-negotiated agreement
between the governing party or coalition and one or more outside support parties.14 A substantive
minority’s defining feature is that, even counting the contracted allegiance, the governing party or
coalition remains a minority.15 In this form of government, the outside party is not considered to
be part of a coalition with the governing party or parties. The inter-party agreement is not a general
commitment to support the government on all policies; the parties’ commitments are specific to
the particular areas detailed in the agreement.16 Accordingly, substantive minority governments
may have alliances with various opposition parties and such alliances are often ideologically,
rather than procedurally, focused.17
In contrast, a formal minority government negotiates a permanent agreement with one or
more external support parties. These parties give a general commitment to support the government

14

Such agreements can be written, unwritten, or confined to one or many policy areas. They are referred to as
legislative agreements, forligs in Denmark, or cooperation agreements in New Zealand. OIREACHTAS LIB. & RES.
SERV., Minority Governments and Parliament 4 (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/housesoftheoireachtas/libraryresearch/lrsnotes/LRSNote_MinorityGove
rnments_Final_4_October_2016_111130.pdf.
15
STRØM, supra note 4, at 62.
16
OIREACHTAS LIB. & RES. SERV., supra note 14.
17
Id. This emphasis on ideology was evident in Denmark’s 2015 minority government, led by Lars Lokke
Rasmussen and the Liberal Party. Although the Liberal Party tried to form a center-right coalition, policy divisions
with three other right-leaning parties prevented the coalition’s formal establishment. The second largest
parliamentary party, the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party, declined to formally join the Liberals on account of
ideological differences regarding taxes, social spending, and the European Union. Further, despite its efforts to form
a right-leaning coalition, one of the Liberal Party’s first acts was to reintroduce a tax break for home improvements,
a policy supported by two leftist parties. Denmark’s New Government: Coalition of One, ECONOMIST (July 2, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21656723-centre-right-liberals-depend-far-right-party-bigger-themselvescoalition-one.
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in return for government commitments on specific policy areas or procedures. 18 Unlike with
substantive minority governments, a formal minority’s outside support provides the government
with the additional seats it needs to constitute a majority.19 Formal minority governments
encourage the ruling party to appoint leaders from the supportive parties in executive positions as
a way of rewarding the parties’ support and encouraging future loyalty.20 While formal agreements
may provide increased stability, they also require a minority government to sacrifice more of its
policy preferences and are more likely to involve concessions to support parties on issues that are
unrelated to the issue in question.21 Although very similar to majority coalitions, supporting parties
in formal minority governments are not officially bound to the ruling party or coalition and
breaking this agreement will not destroy the government.22 Because the inter-party relationships
in substantive and formal agreements are not binding in the same way a coalition’s inter-party
relationships are, a minority government can employ more than one of these policies during its
tenure.23

18

Such agreements are sometimes referred to as confidence and supply agreements, particularly in New Zealand,
Ireland, and Scotland. The most institutionalized of these agreements have been termed contract parliamentarianism.
OIREACHTAS LIB. & RES. SERV., supra note 14, at 5.
19
STRØM, supra note 4, at 62.
20
OIREACHTAS LIB. & RES. SERV., supra note 14, at 5.
21
Id.
22
Whether these agreements are formally binding depends on how institutionalized they become as well as the terms
of the agreement. The support agreements that become highly institutionalized have been termed “contract
parliamentarism.” Id at 4–5. These agreements are very broad and often explicitly exclude uninvolved parties; thus,
they go beyond the more limited and fluid legislative accommodations that minority governments employ to create
shifting coalitions that provide support on individual bills. These support agreements can be binding on the parties
and representatives, such as the so-called “co-operation agreement” between New Zealand’s governing Labour party
and United Future in 2002, which stated that the parties were expected to publicly support “any policy initiatives
arising out of negotiations between them that led to ‘an agreed position.’” Contract parliamentarism is most often
found in Sweden and New Zealand. Tim Bale & Torbjörn Bergman, Captives No Longer, But Servants Still?:
Contract Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New Zealand, 41 GOV’T & OPPOSITION
422, 430–32, 434 (2006).
23
See OIREACHTAS LIB. & RES. SERV., supra note 14, at 4.
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There is no theoretical or empirical consensus on whether a substantive or a formal
minority government is the more effective strategy.24 An empirical analysis of minority
governments in Spain—two of which were substantive and two of which were formal—found that
both types of agreements allowed the government to pass approximately the same percentage of
government bills.25 Empirical analysis of New Zealand and Sweden’s minority governments has
similarly revealed little suggesting a substantial disparity between the different forms’ success
rates.26 A study of one Spanish government, however, found that a small nationalist party
benefitted from using both a substantive and a formal minority government system; though,
empirically, it achieved slightly more during the latter relationship.27 Some analysts have further
found that the more likely the government is to shift alliances on substantive policy issues, the
greater the possibility that the minority government will achieve its preferred policy outcomes,
seemingly encouraging substantive agreements.28
Accordingly, it seems clear that the most effective way to ensure a minority government’s
survival and success is context-dependent and turns on the country’s party system, institutions,
and procedure.29 For instance, minority governments that do not hold the parliament’s central
policy position are in a weaker position and thus tend to seek formal support agreements over the
shifting alliances associated with substantive minority systems.30
B. Challenges Associated with Minority Governments

24

While effectiveness is a subjective term, most analysts use a set of indicators to assess the performance of
governments. Such indicators include the proportion of the governing party or coalition’s bills the government
manages to pass, the overall number of bills passed, and the government’s tenure and durability. Id. at 5.
25
The substantive minority government passed eighty-eight percent of bills and the formal government passed
approximately eighty-seven percent of bills. Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 6.
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Minority governments face heightened challenges, as single-party minority governments
and minority coalitions are subject to the same dangers and shortcomings as majority coalition
governments but with a greater regularity of daunting outcomes. When a parliamentary coalition
governs, party discipline is paramount because dissenting votes within the governing coalition’s
membership threaten to destabilize the coalition itself.31 This is especially important in minority
governments where each individual vote is crucial to the government’s ability to advance its
initiatives. When determining which party alliances are necessary to pass legislation or preserve
the government’s position, the governing coalition cannot afford internal discord and strongly
relies on each coalition member to vote in favor of the proposed policies. Dissenting votes from
within the governing parties thus severely undermine the government’s position and can be far
more detrimental to a minority government than they would be to a majority government. Though
party discipline is important in all minority governments, it is particularly relevant to minority
coalitions where alliances must cross ideological lines, thereby introducing a wider range of beliefs
and forcing the government to advance policies that are acceptable to all represented positions.32
Another consequence of coalition arrangements is that they may confer greater influence
on smaller, regionalized parties.33 In highly divisive elections that threaten to withhold a majority
result, smaller parties become increasingly important as they may determine the outcome of the
election. Therefore, larger parties look to smaller parties as prospective coalition partners, paying
particular attention to whether the smaller party’s ideology is positioned between multiple parties
and whether the smaller party has enough support to push the larger parties into majority territory.34
Accordingly, smaller parties’ interests and movements become increasingly important. By

31

Albert, supra note 3, at 568.
See id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
32
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refusing to form or join a minority government’s coalition, the smaller parties’ influence persists
throughout the government’s tenure, as a failure to adequately appeal to the smaller parties may
prove fatal to the governing parties. Similarly, even if the smaller party does join a minority
coalition, larger parties still must take care to continuously cater to the smaller party’s ideas or risk
dissenting votes from within the coalition. Thus, minority governments grant small parties more
influence than they would otherwise possess.
Minority coalitions are further disadvantaged because they face the same challenges as
majority coalitions without the benefit of a majority’s security. Because coalition governments
have to invest resources in processes that otherwise would not be necessary, the various steps
associated with building and sustaining coalitions may diminish legislative efficiency.35 It is
widely acknowledged that “coalition governments face several challenges, including creating a
coalition, managing the allocation of Cabinet portfolios, consulting with coalition parties and their
respective pressure or interest groups, managing intra-coalition and inter-party disagreements, or
shoring up legislative coalitions.”36 Coalition-building—which is one of the most important, and
complex, elements of coalition governments—begins after the election, and the inter-party
negotiations required to form the coalition can take months.37 These negotiations entail substantial
expenses including bargaining costs,38 policy costs,39 and office costs.40
In some ways, minority governments resemble divided governments in presidential
systems where the executive and the legislature are controlled by different parties. Both

35

Though this problem is slightly augmented in minority coalitions, it also burdens majority coalitions. Id. at 569.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Bargaining costs refer to the time required to build a coalition and resolve subsidiary coalition matters. Id.
39
Policy costs are associated with compromise and concession in developing a governing program. Id.
40
Here, office costs refer to the payout or distribution of portfolios. Id. at 570. For a brief discussion on how these
costs may affect a plurality party’s decision to form a coalition, see discussion infra Section III.A.
36
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governments generally are inefficient in passing the governing party’s legislative agenda in full,
and both disperse power in a similar fashion, affording both the governing and opposition parties
the ability to meaningfully shape policy.41 Once formed, minority governments are constantly
vulnerable to extemporaneous votes of no confidence, thus constraining the prime minister’s
political agenda to shorter commitments and continuously keeping political parties prepared for
elections.42
Because of the different governance styles the various types of government must adopt to
work effectively, there is a notable difference between the categories’ tenures. In parliamentary
democracies, a single party majority holds power for an average of thirty months, and coalitions
retain power for an average of seventeen to eighteen months.43 Minority governments have the
shortest tenure, averaging only thirteen to fourteen months.44 Ultimately, though minority
governments serve the shortest terms, multiple studies have shown that minority governments do
not threaten democratic stability, regardless of the constitutional system in which they emerge.45
II. THE FORMATION OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS
Theoretically, minority governments may form in any parliamentary system; however,
certain systemic prerequisites may affect the likelihood that a minority government will emerge.
One such factor is the type of investiture rules present in the country as a means of allowing the
government to formally take power, with negative investiture rules more easily lending themselves

41

Albert, supra note 3, at 565.
Id. at 565–66.
43
Paul Cairney, Coalition and Minority Government in Scotland: Lessons for the United Kingdom?, 82 POL. Q. 261,
261 (2011).
44
Id.
45
E.g., STRØM, supra note 4, at 243–44. But see Robert Elgie & Petra Schleiter, Variation in the Durability of SemiPresidential Democracies, in SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 42, 47 (Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup &
Yu-Shan Wu eds., 2011).
42
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to the creation of minority governments. Other relevant factors are categorically included under
the social and political context surrounding the pertinent elections.
A. The Role of Investiture Rules
Traditionally, coalition theorists have assumed that coalitions can only take power if they
hold a legislative majority, but literature has shown that coalitions can be successful even if they
control less than half of the legislature.46 An inclusive empirical investigation of government
formation theories tested several hypotheses of government formation, including the position that
“potential governments controlling a minority of seats in the legislature are less likely to form in
the presence of an investiture vote.”47 This study seemingly confirmed the theory that minority
governments are less likely to form in countries that require a government to pass an investiture
vote before assuming power.48

46

See, e.g., TORBJÖRN BERGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL RULES AND PARTY GOALS IN COALITION FORMATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF WINNING MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN SWEDEN 4 (1995) (stating that, when analyzing a minority
coalition’s success, “The assumed threshold still is an absolute majority, but because a (implicit) distinction is made
between containing an absolute majority and having the support of an absolute majority, minority governments are
no longer such a remarkable puzzle in coalition theory.”)
47
This study tested a total of 17 hypotheses in a sample of 220 coalition bargaining situations within 14 countries.
Lanny W. Martin & Randolph T. Stevenson, Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, 45 AM. J. POL.
SCIENCE 33, 37 (2001).
48
Id. at 46. Systems that do not require the incoming government to pass investiture votes are considered to employ
negative parliamentarism. Negative parliamentarism is a feature of government in which “parties can enter executive
offices even without visible and explicit support from a majority of MPs. What a potential government coalition has
to avoid is an active majority against it holding power.” Negative parliamentarism is a decision rule and often
promotes minority government formation, as “it is easier to avoid being opposed by a majority than to gain support
from a majority.” Natalia Ajenjo, Shane Martin, & Bjørn Erik Rasch, The Investiture Vote in Parliaments and
Government Formation 1 (November 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Oslo-Rome International
Workshop on Democracy, the Norwegian Institute in Rome), https://www.uio.no/english/research/interfacultyresearch-areas/democracy/news-and-events/events/seminars/2011/papers-roma-2011/Rome-InvestitureNA-SMBER.pdf. Negative parliamentarism encompasses negative investiture rules, discussed infra, with negative
parliamentarism being more comprehensive and systemic as it is associated with other aspects of government
formation and operation, such as agenda-setting powers. See Federico Russo & Luca Verzichelli, The Adoption of
Positive and Negative Parliamentarism: Systemic or Idiosyncratic Differences 1–2 (April 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the European Consortium for Political Research),
http://www.sv.uio.no/isv/english/research/projects/evolution-parliamentarism/events/seminars/ecpr-salamancarussoverzichelli.pdf.
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There are two different types of investiture rules—positive and negative—that allow a
government to take power, only one of which requires a majority of votes in parliament. 49 The
key underlying principle in a positive form is that a government should be supported by the
parliament.50 Therefore, coalitions in countries that use these rules must win a vote by at least a
relative majority.51 These rules form the basis of systems in Germany, Spain,52 Belgium, Ireland,
Israel, and Italy.53 A negative formulation is a general default and operates on the principle that a
government must merely be tolerated by the parliament. A negative system occurs in the absence
of a requirement that a government be supported by parliament, thus defining the relationship
between the government and the parliament in negative terms. This rule dates back to when the
monarch, rather than the parliament, appointed the government and is found in states such as
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and the United Kingdom.54 In these countries, no
vote of investiture is required; the Head of State formally appoints a Prime Minister and thereby
appoints the government. This government retains power until it is removed via a vote of no
confidence or voluntarily resigns.55

49

Torbjörn Bergman, Formation Rules and Minority Governments, 23 EUR. J. POL. RESEARCH 55, 57 (1993).
Id. Bergman seemingly equates negative investiture rules with negative parliamentarism. See discussion supra
note 48.
51
Bergman, supra note 49.
52
In Germany, a candidate for Chancellor is first appointed by the President. To assume power in a first vote of
investiture this candidate, and thus the coalition he or she represents, must win more than half of the Bundestag’s
votes. If the candidate fails on the first vote, the President can either appoint a Chancellor that has the support of a
relative majority or dissolve the Bundestag. Steffen Ganghof & Christian Stecker, Investiture Rules in Germany:
Stacking the Deck Against Minority Governments, in PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING
INVESTITURE RULES 67, 71–72 (Bjørn Rasch, Shane Martin & José Cheibub eds., 2015). Similarly, in Spain, a
coalition must win an absolute majority in a first vote of investiture. However, if the government fails the first vote,
the Spanish system also allows a Prime Minister to win by a relative majority in a second vote. Id. at 71; Natalia
Ajenjo, Why Minority Governments in Spain? How the Party System Undermines Investiture Rules, in MINORITY
GOVERNMENTS IN SPAIN 153, 153 (Shane Martin, Bjorn Rasch & Jose Cheibub eds., 2015).
53
Unlike Spain or Germany, a new government may take power in Belgium, Ireland, Israel or Italy if a relative
majority of parliament votes in its favor. In all six of these countries, though the Head of State is constrained by
Parliament, his appointment does not require a vote of investiture and the government remains in power until the
opposition wins a vote of no confidence or the government resigns. Bergman, supra note 49.
54
Id.
55
Id.
50
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Because negative rules allow a government to take power without explicitly proving
majority support in parliament, negative rules facilitate the creation of minority governments.56
Between 1945 and 1987, for example, only fourteen percent of West Germany’s governments had
minority status.57 These governments were transitional and only held power for a few months. In
contrast, during the same time period, eighty-eight percent of Danish governments were
minorities.58 Further, minority governments in countries with positive rules tend to hold a larger
proportion of parliamentary seats than their counterparts in countries with negative rules, often
falling just short of an absolute majority.59
Countries such as the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden have systems that contain a
mixture of positive and negative rules. In the Netherlands, a vote of investiture is not strictly
required but there is a strong norm suggesting the government should command majority support,
not mere toleration, in the parliament.60 Portugal61 and Sweden62 combine the negative principle
of tolerance with the positive requirement that parliament vote on the government’s policy plans
or cabinet.63
Despite these findings, there is still some debate as to the importance of investiture rules
in government formation. Prominent scholars of minority government formation have asserted
that, “obviously, all [parliamentary] governments implicitly face an investiture vote whenever they

56

Id., at 59–62.
Id. at 59.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 60–62.
60
Id. at 57–58.
61
“In Portugal a government appointed by the Head of State must present the parliament with its policy program
within 10 days.” The program is accepted unless an absolute majority of parliament rejects the program, in which
case the government must resign. Id. at 58.
62
In Sweden, a coalition must positively prove that an absolute majority of the parliament will tolerate it before the
coalition may assume power. The parliament’s Speaker suggests a candidate for Prime Minister and, so long as an
absolute majority does not vote against the candidate and his cabinet, the candidate may assume power. Id.
63
Id.
57
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first expose themselves to the possibility of a parliamentary no confidence vote.” 64 Thus, the
argument contends, the defining feature of parliamentarism—the need for government to maintain
legislative confidence—prevails regardless of whether the system requires a formal showing of
parliamentary support.65 Evidence exploring the length of time required for governments to form66
further bolsters scholars’ claims that investiture rules hold minimal significance in determining
whether minority governments will form. The period between elections and government formation
has lasted mere hours in some instances and months in others.67 If investiture rules play a key role
in government formation, these scholars argue, they should add to the bargaining complexity and
thus the time required to form a governing coalition. The existing literature has not definitively
established whether this presumption is accurate. All else equal, one study of governments in
Western Europe revealed that negative investiture rules often allow governments to form more
quickly. However, another study containing multivariate analysis suggested that there was no
meaningful difference in formation periods between systems with negative investiture rules and
systems with positive investiture rules.68

64

Kaare Strøm, Ian Budge & Michael J. Laver, Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies,
38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 303, 311 (1994).
65
Bjørn Erik Rasch, Shane Martin & José Antonio Cheibub, Investiture Rules and Government Formation, in
PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING INVESTITURE RULES 1, 13 (Bjørn Rasch, Shane Martin
& José Cheibub eds., 2015). Put differently, scholars have summarized the argument as follows: “Ultimately, a
parliamentary government may be removed from office any time a majority of legislators decides that this is what
should happen. As a result, any incoming government must be able to survive a vote of no confidence and, hence,
enjoy the support of a legislative majority even if it never has to explicitly demonstrate this through an actual vote.”
Matt Golder, Sona N. Golder & David A. Siegel, Modeling the Institutional Foundation of Parliamentary
Government Formation, 74 J. POL. 427, 430 (2012).
66
In the period between the election and the new government’s formation, countries are generally run by a caretaker
government. In most countries, there is an informal understanding that caretaker governments avoid making major
policy decisions. Ben Seyd, Coalition Government in Britain: Lessons from Overseas, NUFFIELD FOUND. 59–61
(Jan. 2002), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/publications/tabs/unit-publications/84.pdf.
67
See Rasch, Martin & Cheibub, supra note 65, at 14.
68
The study found that governments in systems defined by negative parliamentarism took an average of thirty-three
days to form and governments in systems with positive parliamentarism took an average of forty-four days.
Subsequent multivariate analysis, however, has reached different conclusions, suggesting that there was no
meaningful difference in the length of time between elections and government formation in systems with positive
versus negative rules. The findings did conclude that there was a minor difference in the established government’s
tenure. Id. at 15.
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B. The Role of Political Context
As with all elections, political context surrounding elections that produce minority
governments is crucial in determining how the elected officials will act once in office. Primarily,
it can affect the plurality party’s decision to build coalitions or govern as a minority. Political
context can also explain the prerequisite conditions that make minority governments more likely
to emerge.
1. Problematic Justifications
Few scholars have studied minority governments in depth. Rather, many have superficially
addressed these governments in furtherance of an alternate point. Consequently, many of the
prominently cited justifications for minority governments come from surface level interactions and
cannot survive careful scrutiny. Such common but flawed explanations include political crisis or
systemic instability, party system fractionalization, conflict and polarization, and other proximate
conditions. Although many of these justifications seem facially logical, they are not empirically
supported and often fall under a cursory investigation.
a. Political Crisis and Instability
Many scholars cite minority governments as the byproduct of political crisis and instability;
however,

this

association

is

rarely

developed

in

great

detail

and

is

often

unsubstantiated.69According to such crisis explanations, political instability is a precondition of
minority government formation and thus there is a direct correlation between political instability
and the manifestation of minority governments.70 These crisis explanations fail to identify the
locus or severity of crisis that must exist to give rise to a minority government. A strong
interpretation of this theory would equate minority governments with severe systemic instability,
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such as civil disorder, riots, or strikes. A weaker interpretation might merely link minority
governments with cabinet instability.71
The crisis explanation further fails to account for minority governments’ presence, and
indeed prevalence, absent crisis conditions in highly stable and politically tranquil democracies.72
In fact, minority governments are most often present in functioning Western democracies, such as
Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain.73 Indeed, the presence of a successful minority
government may actually reflect underlying political and social stability, as intra-party cooperation
and inter-party loyalty in the face of a divided constituency is crucial to such governments’
operation. When fifteen polities were ranked according to the relative incidence of minority
governance, Norway, Sweden, and Canada topped the list, with Portugal, the United Kingdom,
and Israel filling the bottom spots.74 There is hardly any evidence suggesting that this ranking can
be linked to systemic government instability.
Finally, the most persistent explanation seeks to link minority governments to cabinet
instability, though this hypothesis is also empirically unsupported.75 With the exception of
Denmark, fifteen countries sampled naturally separate into two, equally sizeable groups: those
with low cabinet stability76 and those with high cabinet stability.77 The comparison further revealed
that minority governments constitute 26.8% of all governments in the low stability group and
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37.2% of governments in the high stability group.78 When only minority situations79 are
considered, minority governments accounted for 28.1% of governments in the low stability
countries and 54.8% of governments in the high stability group.80 Therefore, the empirical
evidence rejects the common hypothesis that minority governments are associated with cabinet
instability, instead suggesting that minority governments are actually more closely linked, albeit
loosely, with high cabinet stability.
b. Party System Fractionalization
Scholars also commonly associate minority governments with political fragmentation and
party system fractionalization.81 This argument asserts that the more fractionalized a parliamentary
system is the more difficult it will be for the public to agree on a majority party in an election or
for the elected parties to form a majority coalition, thus increasing the likelihood of a minority
government.82
When investigated, this hypothesis also fails. The fractionalization theory has been tested
against available data in Douglas Rae’s index of fractionalization for legislative seats,83 which
revealed that average fractionalization scores for minority governments’ legislatures are lower than
the average fractionalization scores present in majority coalitions.84 Although the difference
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between the average fractionalization scores is not dramatic,85 it nevertheless cuts against the
prevailing hypothesis that fractionalization encourages minority governments.
c. Conflict and Polarization
Political conflict and polarization is also commonly cited in conjunction with other factors,
particularly conditions of fractionalization and instability, to justify the existence of minority
governments. The definition of polarization in such studies, however, is often ambiguous and
inconsistent.86 Some scholars have described polarization as the ideological expanse contained
within the party system while others have used the term to signify “bipolar distributions of the
electorate on various conflict dimensions, the cumulations of such cleavages, or the resultant social
tensions and hostilities.”87 The unifying feature of each definition is that, unlike fractionalization,
which stresses the numerical propensities of party systems, these accounts emphasize the
ideological character of its members and their interaction.88 Reasoning that cleavage, conflict,
extremism, and polarization negatively affect parties’ willingness to negotiate, proponents of this
theory argue that polarization becomes a primary cause of minority government formation.89
Measuring polarization as the proportion of legislative seats held by extremist parties,90
studies show that polarization relates to government type in essentially the same way as
fractionalization.91 Majority party governments tend to form in less polarized systems, and
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nonpartisan governments form in the most polarized and fractionalized environments. 92 On
average, minority governments do not tend to appear in more polarized environments than those
that produce majority coalitions.93 Rather, substantive minority governments are associated with
noticeably lower levels of polarization than are majority coalitions.94
d. Proximate Conditions
The final problematic explanation for the formation of minority governments is the
conventional assumption that minority governments form only when all other options have been
exhausted or no other alternatives exist. Under this reasoning, minority governments represent
failed interparty relationships.95 Such explanations are commonly found in deductive coalition
theories, which associate minority governments with constraints, limited choice, failure to
negotiate, and lower-order preferences.96 If this hypothesis is true, minority governments should
be associated with particularly long cabinet crises and numerous formation attempts. Kaare Strøm,
a political science professor at the University of California and a leading authority on minority
government operation, tested this hypothesis and found that, on average, substantive minority
governments and majority coalitions have a very similar number of formation attempts: 2.00
versus 2.01, respectively.97 Strøm further found that the average crisis preceding the formation of
a majority government—including majority coalitions—lasted approximately 26.2 days, whereas
the crisis preceding the formation of a minority government lasted only 16.1 days, ending
approximately 40 percent earlier than crises associated with majority regimes.98
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Though counterintuitive, this difference may partially be explained by the number of
parties involved in the government’s formation. The study revealed that single-party majority
governments formed in only 8.4 days, while majority coalitions took approximately 31.3 days. 99
Similarly, substantive minority governments formed in 13.5 days, whereas formal minority
governments formed in 36.7 days.100 Because substantive minority governments tend to be singleparty minorities with fewer formal inter-party agreements, fewer parties are likely to be involved
in the negotiations leading up to the government’s formation.101 Thus, Strøm’s study generally
showed that when multiple parties are involved in the government’s formation the duration of the
pre-formation crisis increases.102
2. Alternative Justification of Rational Choice
Minority government formation may be better explained by rational choice theory. A
parliamentary majority is not a strict prerequisite for government functionality, and political parties
are thus primarily concerned with both political office and political influence.103 To the extent that
effectuating policy initiatives motivates party behavior, government participation is a helpful, but
not necessary, condition.104 Political parties realize the importance of long term goals and are
concerned about potential effects on future elections, particularly competitive elections.105 All of
these factors combined help to explain why governing and opposition parties may opt not to form
a majority coalition, instead ruling as a minority.
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Political victory is crucial to analyses of political competition and is often defined as a
party’s ability to effectuate its positions through legislative acts.106 This success is often thought
to require an absolute majority in the legislature; however, there are several reasons to question
this assumption. Legislative decisions often require qualified majorities,107 simple majorities, or
simple pluralities.108 Systems requiring mere pluralities lend themselves particularly well to
minority governments and become increasingly important when abstentions or divided opposition
can benefit the governments.109
Additionally, when defining political parties merely as organizations that seek power in
government, we should expect parties to prioritize votes or power. Though electoral success is a
defining factor, party goals beyond mere government authority complicate this minimalistic
definition.110 For example, in addition to constituents, parties need activists and members, many
of whom are motivated by policy concerns, not government control.111 In competitive political
systems, party officials, often selected based on their history of loyalty to the party, must be
responsive to their followers’ concerns and thus often share the same long-term goals.112
If policy advancement replaces government office as a party’s primary motivator, holding
political office becomes less important. This conclusion may seem counter-intuitive because the
governing party dominates the government’s focuses and objectives. However, closer examination
shows that opposition parties, despite their minority status, can still further their policy
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objectives.113 First, it is possible that the governing party’s views may align with an opposition
party’s views on certain issues.114 If this condition is met and the party’s constituents are results
focused, the party will be rewarded even if it is not directly responsible for the policy’s
advancement. Therefore, the opposition party does not need a majority of seats but can simply sit
back and allow the governing party to progress the platform.
Second, even if the opposition party and governing party disagree on policy, the opposition
party may still be able to exert political influence.115 In some political systems, many important
policy decisions happen outside of the party-parliament relationship116 and opposition parties may
use public criticism and other negotiation methods to assert their influence.117 Therefore, policy
influence can more precisely be measured by degree, with the relative policy influence varying
between the parties and polities.118 Strøm describes this relationship as a policy influence
differential in which “the higher the policy influence differential, the greater the power of the
government vis-à-vis the opposition. The smaller the differential, the less of an advantage it is to
be in office.”119 Generally, Strøm concludes, the lower the differential, the smaller the incentives
for policy-motivated parties to hold office and the more likely that opportunities to expand the
governing coalition will be ignored.120
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Moreover, political parties adopt a temporal perspective oriented toward effectuating future
success for their party. Therefore, particularly in competitive elections, political parties carefully
consider how their stances will influence their chances in future elections and are discouraged from
forming coalitions that could secure a government majority if they believe their future interests
would be better served by remaining separate.121 Additionally, when considering future impacts,
incumbency may actually prove to be an electoral disadvantage.122 Incumbent parties have less
opportunity to choose their campaign issues and strategies and are more likely to have their
reliability and responsibility tested.123 Therefore, governing parties can more easily lose the
confidence of their constituency, a difference that several empirical studies have shown to reduce
party votes in subsequent elections.124 Ceteris paribus, rational actors prefer individual,
instantaneous success and thus opposition parties will be unlikely to formally join the governing
party if they predict that a subsequent election will be competitive, in which case the consequences
associated with incumbency are especially relevant.125
Finally, competitive elections tend to make it difficult for a single party to secure a
meaningful majority and therefore encourage inclusive, moderate party platforms.126 The link
between competitive elections and minority governments is evident in Scandinavian countries.127
Denmark, for instance, has only experienced one single-party majority government, which held
power at the beginning of the twentieth century.128 Rather, minority governments tend to be the
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rule, rather than the exception.129 In Denmark, electoral competition has made it more difficult for
government parties to forge legislative coalitions, instead forcing them to rely on “ad hoc alliances
with whichever party is closest to its stance on the issue in question.”130 This competitive
atmosphere discourages formal and permanent coalition building and, thus, larger parties are more
likely to govern as substantive minorities. Ireland’s Fianna Fáil party also governs in a competitive
environment, and this competition with other parties, coupled with the sheer size of their support,
makes the Fianna Fáil unwilling to contemplate a formal coalition or any other form of cooperation
that may secure the additional seats needed to form a majority.131
II. MINORITY GOVERNMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The various types of constitutional structures underlying a parliamentary system may affect
the recurrence of minority governments. Of particular importance is the country’s electoral system,
where first-past-the-post (“FPTP”) systems are more likely to reduce the number of active political
parties, particularly at the national level, and are therefore less likely to produce a diverse
parliament hosting a wide variety of political parties. Proportional representation systems,
however, are more likely to reward small parties with legislative seats and thus tend to produce
parliaments that contain a larger number of small and independent parties. Thus, proportional
representation systems are more likely to produce minority governments than are FPTP systems.132
A country’s executive structure is also important; this structure, however, is less relevant
to minority government development and is thought to play a more substantial role in determining
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a government’s stability once a minority government takes hold. Although statistically unfounded,
some fear that divided minority governments in semi-presidential systems may pose a particular
risk to the checks and balances associated with democracy and create an unstable government.133
Ultimately, when tested, this negative association has not materialized.134
A. Minority Governments and Electoral Systems
Minority and coalition governments are inexorably linked to their country’s electoral
system. FPTP systems are winner take all systems in which a candidate or party needs to secure a
majority of votes cast in an election.135 Duverger’s hypothesis asserts that FPTP and singlemember simple plurality systems force voters and politicians to unite around a relatively moderate
position to have a viable chance of winning a majority of votes in any election. This consolidation
either completely eliminates smaller third parties or incorporates them into a dominant party,
thereby creating a bipolar two-party system.136 In contrast, proportional representation (“PR”)
systems assign legislative seats to political parties based on the percentage of the popular vote each
party received in the election.137 Although many PR systems require parties to meet or surpass a
designated minimum percentage of votes before a party will be awarded a legislative seat, the
threshold is generally low. Thus, PR systems reward smaller parties and encourage a large number
of parties with narrowly-tailored political platforms.138
Minority governments may arise under FPTP electoral systems; however, because FPTP
systems encourage fewer parties, minority governments are less likely to emerge and survive.
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Canadian Parliamentarism exemplifies this phenomenon. The 2004 federal elections produced a
minority government for the first time since 1979 with parliamentary seats split between a total of
five parties.139 The governing Liberal Party earned 37% percent of the popular vote and 135 of the
308 legislative seats,140 and the second-place Conservative Party earned 30% of the popular vote
and 99 parliamentary seats.141 The established minority government, headed by Prime Minister
Paul Martin, was plagued by political instability and lasted only eighteen months before falling to
a vote of no confidence in the House of Commons.142 Other Canadian minority governments have
similarly proven unstable. The minority government from 1972 to 1974, for instance, maintained
a constant state of crisis control, fearful that its unsteady support system would collapse.143 The
minority governments that served from 1962 to 1963 and 1979 to 1980 were similarly unsteady
and ineffective, the former even attracting the attention of prominent American news sources
which warned of the economic risks associated with Canadian minority governments.144
Nevertheless, not all minority governments in FPTP systems are destined for failure.
Canada can also be used to exemplify this conclusion. Prime Minister Pearson’s minority
governments in the 1960s, for instance, were highly productive. Despite their minority status, these
governments passed the Canadian Pension Plan and the Canada Student Loan program,
modernized the country’s immigration policy, created a new Canadian national flag, renewed
national bilingualism, and established national health care.145 Accordingly, minority governments
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in FPTP systems may be successful and stable, but only if the governing party is willing to
compromise in the larger interest of political stability.
Minority or coalition governments are far more likely in PR systems where small parties
are more prevalent in the larger legislative body.146 In some cases, the costs of building and
sustaining a working coalition, particularly a minority coalition, may be so great as to compel the
plurality party’s leader to abandon efforts at coalition-building and simply govern as a single party
minority.147 When larger parties do choose to endure the costs associated with forming a
coalition,148 there are additional inefficiencies associated with maintaining the relationships. As
time progresses, coalition members discover fewer matters upon which they may agree or
adequately compromise, destabilizing the coalition and weakening its members’ dependability.149
The legislative inefficiency associated with maintaining a coalition government also exacts a
significant cost on political ideology. The parties constituting a coalition must dilute their policies
to successfully present a bill that garners support from the entire coalition, and even then the
resultant bill may require further concessions before the broader legislative assembly will approve
it.150
Accordingly, coalitions are less likely to survive than single-party governments, a
difference that may be explained by several factors. First, because a governing coalition may
contain Cabinet members from different political parties, the prominent officials within the
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government may have different constituencies and different interests that cause them to advocate
for conflicting positions.151 Second, ministers may take positions that undermine the stability of
the coalition in the interest of demonstrating their autonomy.152 Third, prominent officials within
the coalition must navigate what may be an uneasy alliance, largely held together by convenience
and the desire for power.153 These and other factors combine to create a government that displays
legislative inefficiency similar to those that critics attribute to presidential systems.154
Though these findings apply to all coalition governments, including majority coalitions,
they apply more strongly to minority governments and minority coalitions, which heavily rely on
external support. Further, because minority governments depend so heavily on outside parties, they
are constantly forced to confront these problems both within their formed coalitions as well as with
parties with which they are not formally fused.
Finally, certain types of PR systems are more likely to produce minority governments.155
Although Mixed Member Proportional (“MMP”) electoral systems often produce minority
governments,156 such governments are not as common in MMP systems as in other PR systems.157
MMP systems are systems in which legislative seats are awarded to compensate for any
disproportionality produced by results for district seats.158 Depending on the country, voters may
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get one choice with the party totals derived from the totals for the individual district candidates or
two separate choices.159 The imbalanced production of minority governments is counter intuitive,
because
MMP contains incentives for voters to split their ticket, that is to vote for a
party with their list vote but support a candidate of a different party with
their constituency vote as a signal to parties which coalition they prefer.
Hence, it is rational for parties to form pre-election coalitions and, when
successful in general elections, to govern together.160
Perhaps for exactly this reason, minority governments in countries using MMP systems are more
often minority coalitions than single party minorities.161
Single transferable vote (“STV”) systems are also likely to yield coalition minority
governments. An STV system uses multi-member districts and allows voters to rank candidates by
preference.162 “At the first count, the total number of first-preference votes for each candidate is
ascertained” and any “candidate who has a number of first preferences greater than or equal to the
[designated] quota is immediately elected.”163 In subsequent counts, the votes for candidates who
have surpassed the quota are redistributed according to the voters’ second preferences.164 Though
political scientists claim an STV system is one of the most attractive electoral systems, it is only
practiced in a handful of countries, including Ireland.165 One study from 1990 to 2006 revealed
that STV systems produced minority coalitions approximately 24% of the time, though no singleparty minority governments emerged during this time period.166
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Although such PR systems are more likely to produce minority governments than other
types of governments, it is important to note that these systems more commonly produce majority
governments than minority governments.167 The study mentioned supra showed that between 1990
and 2006, countries using MMP systems produce single-party minorities only 2% of the time and
minority coalitions only 20% of the time.168 STV systems produced minority coalitions 24% of
the time and no single-party minority governments.169 In total, minority governments constituted
less than 30% of all governments in PR systems in the studied time period.170
B. Minority Governments and Semi-Presidential Systems
Semi-presidential systems can produce a rare type of minority government, termed a
divided minority government.171 A divided minority government occurs where “neither the
president nor prime minister, nor any party or coalition, enjoys a substantive majority in the
legislature” and has been labeled “semi-presidentialism’s most conflict-prone subtype.”172 Some
scholars reason that divided minority governments are particularly dangerous when the parties
reach a stalemate and the legislature and president cannot have support or influence on a party or
party coalition.173 In such conditions, there is a threat that, in an effort to defeat the stalemate and
advance his position, the president may attempt to govern without or against the legislature,
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dissolve the sitting legislature in the hopes of securing a future majority, or even disband the
legislature.174
Some scholars have associated divided minority governments with legislative paralysis and
presidential dominance.175 Because the legislature is ineffective and immobile, they argue, these
governments create a risk that the president may attempt to expand executive power to fill the
void.176 This presidential expansion is “accompanied by a narrowing of the decision-making arena
to a small, handpicked group of nonparty ministers.”177 Accordingly, divided minority
governments may prove detrimental to the separation of powers and pose a greater risk of
democratic breakdown than any other sub-type of semi-presidentialism.178 These governments are
especially dangerous to young democracies that are vulnerable to executive overreach, particularly
those that do not have a stabilized party system.179
When studied closely, however, these fears proved unfounded. Controlling for all other
relevant factors, studies have not exposed the expected correlation between divided minority
governments and democratic collapse.180 Rather, such studies discovered a positive relationship
between the presence of divided minority governments and democratic performance.181 It appears
that pre-existing constitutional and structural incentives to power share have effectively prevented
presidents in divided minority governments from overstepping their bounds.182 In fact, divided
minority governments are most prevalent in successful semi-presidential democracies.183 Despite

174

Id.
ELGIE, supra note 134, at 13.
176
Id.
177
SKACH, supra note 172, at 124.
178
Id. at 18.
179
ELGIE, supra note 134, at 13.
180
Id. at 179.
181
Id. at 181–82.
182
Elgie & Schleiter, supra note 45, at 58–59.
183
ELGIE, supra note 134, at 182.
175

30

the severity of the predicted damage, no country with a semi-presidential system has ever collapsed
during a divided minority government’s tenure.184
Because presidents do not govern in a vacuum, strong presidents are neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for democratic instability in semi-presidential countries.185 Where
divided minority governments have historically been associated with democratic decline, this
instability is better attributed to the dual accountability in a president-parliamentary system.186
This is particularly the case where a prime minister is appointed by the president despite
parliamentary opposition, thereby causing a power struggle between the president and parliament
with the prime minister caught in the middle.187 This conflict “may result in frequent cabinet
reshuffles and government collapses.”188
Between 2000 and 2008, Taiwan had a divided minority government in which the president
and cabinet battled against an opposing parliamentary coalition.189 The Legislative Yuan was
controlled by the Pan-Blue camp and President Chen insisted on appointing a fellow member of
the Democratic Progressive Party as premier.190 Although President Chen appointed a total of six
prime ministers during this period without the legislature’s consent and thus “had his way in
forming the government, he could not stop the parliament from retaliation in other
battlegrounds.”191 The Pan-Blue sect in the Legislative Yuan resisted Chen’s policy initiatives,
effectively boycotted, and, though politically unable to follow through, threatened to impeach, the
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president.192 Therefore, because the minority government’s president and parliament dominated
different territories, the opposition-controlled parliament was able to effectively prevent President
Chen from radically expanding his powers.193 This conflict was tense, but eventually subsided with
Taiwan’s democracy firmly in place.194
CONCLUSION
Minority governments are fairly common in parliamentary systems and have governed in
multiple stable and successful democracies, as well as countries like Taiwan where preserving
democracy can be more difficult.195 Minority governments can form in a variety of systems
depending on a multitude of factors, though PR electoral systems are more likely to produce
minority governments than FPTP systems. Scholars have expressed concerns about the impacts
that minority governments can have on democracy, particularly in semi-presidential systems.
Ultimately, empirical studies suggest that not only are these predictions unfounded, but the inverse
is actually true and minority governments tend to enhance democratic function by forcing opposing
parties to work together as the only means of advancing their policy initiatives. Therefore, although
the concept of governance by a minority of the population’s representatives may seem dangerous
to democracy, minority governments should not be feared and should be accepted as a normal
result of a functioning democracy.
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APPENDIX: MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN RECENT HISTORY196
I. WESTERN EUROPE
A. Spain197
Government Party: Central Democratic Union
Leader: Adolfo Suarez
Tenure: July 1977–April 1979198
Government Party: Central Democratic Union
Leader: Adolfo Suarez
Tenure: April 1979–January 1981199
Government Party: Central Democratic Union
Leader: Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo
Tenure: February 1981–October 1982200
Government Party: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
Leader: Felipe Gonzalez
Tenure: December 1989–July 1993
Government Party: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
Leader: Felipe Gonzalez
Tenure: July 1993–May 1996
Government Party: People’s Party
Leader: José María Aznar
Tenure: May 1996–April 2000
Government Party: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
Leader: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero
Tenure: April 2004–April 2008
Government Party: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
Leader: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero
Tenure: April 2008 – December 2011
Government Party: People’s Party
Leader: Mariano Rajoy
196

This section will only include federal minority governments and will thus exclude minority governments on the
local level. For purposes of this section, the term “recent history” refers to the post-World War II period.
197
Ajenjo, supra note 52, at 160.
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Tenure: October 2016 – Present201
B. Portugal202
Government Party: Socialist; Military; and Center Social Democratic
Leader: Mário Soares
Tenure: July 1976–December 1977
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Aníbal Cavaco Silva
Tenure: November 1985–April 1987
Government Party: Socialist
Leader: Antonio Guterres
Tenure: October 1995–October 1999203
Government Party: Socialist
Leader: Antonio Guterres
Tenure: October 1999–March 2002204
Government Party: Socialist
Leader: José Sócrates
Tenure: September 2009–June 2011205
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Pedro Passos Coelho
Tenure: October 2015–November 2015206
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Bonnie N. Field, Will the New Rajoy Minority Government in Spain Work?, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI.:
EUROPP (Nov. 16, 2016), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/11/16/will-the-new-rajoy-minority-governmentin-spain-work/.
202
STRØM, supra note 4, at 266.
203
Francisco José Viega & Linda Gonçalves Viega, The Determinants of Vote Intentions in Portugal, 118 PUB.
CHOICE 342, 348 tbl.2 (2004),
https://repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt/bitstream/1822/1455/1/Public_Choice_March_2004.pdf.
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Portugal, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/portugal (last visited Mar. 31,
2018).
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See Angelique Chrisafis, Portugese MPs Force Minority Government to Quit over Austerity, GUARDIAN (Nov.
10, 2015, 2:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/10/portuguese-mps-force-minority-governmentto-quit-over-austerity.
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C. Germany207
Government Party: Christian Democratic Union of Germany
Leader: Konrad Adenauer
Tenure: November 1962
Government Party: Christian Democratic Union of Germany
Leader: Ludwig Erhard
Tenure: November 1965–December 1965
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Helmut Schmidt
Tenure: September 1982
D. Belgium208
Government Party: Wallon Socialist
Leader: Paul-Henri Spaak
Tenure: March 1946
Government Party: Christian Social
Leader: Gaston Eyskens
Tenure: June 1958–November 1958
Government Party: Flemish Christian People’s Party; Wallon Christian Socialist; Liberal; and
Flemish Liberal
Leader: Leonard Tindemans
Tenure: April 1974–June 1974
Government Party: Flemish Christian People’s Party; Wallon Christian Socialist; Liberal; and
Flemish Liberal
Leader: Leonard Tindemans
Tenure: March 1977–April 1977
E. Italy209
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Alcide De Gasperi
Tenure: May 1947–December 1947

207

All three minority cabinets in Germany in the time period studied were transitory in the run-up to the formation
of a new government within the term and none of them resulted from an investiture vote. Ganghof & Stecker, supra
note 52, at 14, 16, 18. See Manfred G. Schmidt, Germany: The Grand Coalition State, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN
EUROPE 55 (Josep M. Colomer ed., 2002).
208
STRØM, supra note 4, at 246.
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Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Alcide De Gasperi
Tenure: July 1953
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Giuseppe Pella
Tenure: August 1953–January 1954
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Amintore Fanfani
Tenure: January 1954
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Adone Zoli
Tenure: May 1957–June 1958
Government Party: Christian Democratic; and Social Democratic
Leader: Amintore Fanfani
Tenure: July 1958–January 1959
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Antonio Segni
Tenure: February 1959–February 1960
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Fernando Tambroni
Tenure: March 1960–July 1960
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Amintore Fanfani
Tenure: July 1960–February 1962
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Giovanni Leone
Tenure: June 1963–November 1963
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Giovanni Leone
Tenure: June 1968–November 1968
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Mariano Rumor
Tenure: August 1969–February 1970
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Giulio Andreotti
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Tenure: February 1972
Government Party: Christian Democratic; and People’s Party
Leader: Aldo Moro
Tenure: November 1974–January 1976
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Giulio Andreotti
Tenure: July 1976–January 1978
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Giulio Andreotti
Tenure: March 1978–January 1979
Government Party: Christian Democratic; Social Democratic; and Republican
Leader: Giulio Andreotti
Tenure: March 1979
Government Party: Christian Democratic; Social Democratic; and Liberal
Leader: Francesco Cossiga
Tenure: August 1979–March 1980
Government Party: Christian Democratic
Leader: Amnitore Fanfani
Tenure: April 1987
Government Party: Democratic Party of the Left; People’s Party; Italian Renewal; Greens; and
Communist Refoundation
Leader: Romano Prodi
Tenure: May 1996–October 1998210
F. Netherlands211
Government Party: Anti-Revolutionary; and Catholic People’s Party
Leader: Jelle Zijlstra
Tenure: November 1966–February 1967
Government Party: Anti-Revolutionary; Catholic People’s Party; Christian Historical Union; and
Liberal
Leader: Barend Biesheuvel
210

Federico Russo, Government Formation in Italy: The Challenge of Bicameral Investiture, in PARLIAMENTS AND
GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING INVESTITURE RULES 136, 144 (Bjørn Rasch, Shane Martin & José Cheibub
eds., 2015); Francesco Marangoni & Michelangelo Vercesi, The Government and Its Hard Decisions: How Conflict
is Managed Within the Coalition, in THE CHALLENGE OF COALITION: THE ITALIAN CASE 17, 20 (Nicoló Conti &
Francesco Marangoni eds., 2014).
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STRØM, supra note 4, at 262.
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Tenure: August 1972–November 1972
Government Party: Christian Democratic Appeal; Democrats 66
Leader: Dries van Agt
Tenure: May 1982–September 1982
Government Party: People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy; and Christian Democratic
Appeal Coalition
Leader: Mark Rutte
Tenure: October 2010–November 2012212
G. France (Fourth Republic)213
Government Party: Socialist
Leader: Léon Blum
Tenure: December 1946–January 1947
Government Party: Popular Republican Movement; Democratic and Socialist Union of the
Resistance; and Radical Socialist
Leader: Georges Bidault
Tenure: February 1950–June 1950
Government Party: Radical Socialist; Popular Republican Movement; Democratic and Socialist
Union of the Resistance; and Conservative
Leader: Henri Queuille
Tenure: July 1950
Government Party: Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance; Popular Republican
Movement; Radical Socialist; Peasant; and Conservative
Leader: René Pleven
Tenure: August 1951–January 1952
Government Party: Radical Socialist; Popular Republican Movement; Democratic and Socialist
Union of the Resistance; Conservative; and Peasant
Leader: Félix Faure
Tenure: January 1952–February 1952
Government Party: Conservatives; Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance; Radical
Socialist; Peasant; and Popular Republican Movement

212

See Anne van der Shoot & Joost Akkermans, The Dutch Have Voted . . . So How Do They Put Together a
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Leader: Antoine Pinay
Tenure: March 1952–December 1952
Government Party: Radical Socialist; Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance; Popular
Republican Movement; Conservative; and Peasant
Leader: René Mayer
Tenure: January 1953–May 1953
Government Party: Socialist; Popular Republican Movement; Democratic and Socialist Union of
the Resistance; and Radical Socialist
Leader: Christian Pineau
Tenure: February 1955
Government Party: Socialist; Radical Socialist; Democratic and Socialist Union of the
Resistance
Leader: Guy Mollet
Tenure: February 1956–May 1957
Government Party: Radical Socialist; Socialist; Democratic and Socialist Union of the
Resistance; and Left Republican
Leader: Maurice Bourges-Maunoury
Tenure: June 1957–September 1957
Government Party: Conservatives; Left Republican; Democratic and Socialist Union of the
Resistance/African Democrats; and Neo-Radical
Leader: Antoine Pinay
Tenure: October 1957
H. United Kingdom214
Government Party: Labour
Leader: Harold Wilson
Tenure: March 1974–October 1974
Government Party: Labour
Leader: James Callaghan
Tenure: November 1976–May 1979
Government Party: Conservative
Leader: John Major
Tenure: December 1996–May 1997215
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In 1996 and 1997 John Major’s government became a minority government because of defections and losses at
by-elections. Stone, supra note 9.
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Government Party: Conservative; and Democratic Unionist
Leader: Theresa May
Tenure: June 2017–Present 216
1. Scotland
Government Party: Scottish National
Leader: Alex Salmond
Tenure: May 2007–May 2011217
Government Party: Scottish National
Leader: Nicola Sturgeon
Tenure: May 2016–Present218
2. Wales
Government Party: Welsh Labour
Leader: Alun Michael
Tenure: May 1999–October 2000219
Government Party: Welsh Labour
Leader: Rhodri Morgan
Tenure: May 2007–July 2007220
I. Ireland221
Government Party: Fine Gael; Labour; National Labout; Clann na Talmhan; and Clann na
Poblachta
Leader: John A. Costello
Tenure: February 1948–June 1951
Government Party: Fianna Fáil
Leader: Éamon de Valera
Tenure: June 1951–May 1954
See Britain’s May Forms Minority Government with Backing of Northern Irish Party, NPR (June 26, 2017, 9:35
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Government Party: Fianna Fáil
Leader: Seán Lemass
Tenure: October 1961–April 1965
Government Party: Fine Gael; and Labour222
Leader: Garret FitzGerald
Tenure: June 1981–January 1982
Government Party: Fianna Fáil
Leader: Charles Haughey
Tenure: March 1982–November 1982
Government Party: Fine Gael, Labour
Leader: Garret Fitzgerald
Tenure: December 1986–January 1987
Government Party: Fianna Fáil
Leader: Charles Haughey
Tenure: February 1987–June 1989
Government Party: Fianna Fáil; and Progressive Democratic
Leader: Bertie Ahern
Tenure: June 1997–June 2002223
Government Party: Fine Gael
Leader: Enda Kenny
Tenure: April 2016–Present224
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2018).
223
Lucinda Maer & Richard Kelly, Hung Parliaments, House of Commons Lib. Briefing Paper No. 04951, at 4
(Oct. 9, 2017), researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN04951/SN04951.pdf.
224
Henry McDonald, Ireland Set for Minority Government after Two Main Parties Reach Deal, GUARDIAN (Apr.
29, 2016, 2:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/29/ireland-fianna-fail-fine-gail-minoritygovernment-enda-kenny.

41

II. EASTERN EUROPE
A. Hungary225
Government Party: Hungarian Socialist
Leader: Ferec Gyurcsány
Tenure: April 2008–April 2009
Government Party: Hungarian Socialist
Leader: Gordon Bajnai
Tenure: April 2009–May 2010
B. Poland226
Government Party: Center
Leader: Jan Olszewski
Tenure: December 1991–June 1992227
Government Party: Democratic Union
Leader: Hanna Suchocka
Tenure: July 1992–May 1993228
Government Party: Solidarity Electoral Action
Leader: Jerzy Buzek
Tenure: June 2000–October 2001
Government Party: Democratic Left Alliance; and Labor Union
Leader: Leszek Miller
Tenure: March 2003–May 2004
Government Party: Democratic Left Alliance; Labor Union
Leader: Marek Belka
Tenure: May 2004–October 2005

225

PARTY PATRONAGE AND PARTY GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES 165 (Petr Kopecký, Peter Mair &
Maria Spirova eds., 2012). In response to growing prejudice and to protect minority rights, in 1993 the Hungarian
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Martin & José Cheibub eds., 2015).
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89, 103 (Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, John Radziłowski & Driusz Tołczyk eds., 2009).
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Government Party: Law and Justice
Leader: Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz
Tenure: October 2005–May 2006
Government Party: Law and Justice
Leader: Jarosław Kaczyński
Tenure: August 2007–November 2007
C. Romania229
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Adrian Năstase
Tenure: December 2000–June 2003
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Adrian Năstase
Tenure: June 2003–March 2004
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Adrian Năstase
Tenure: March–December 2004
Government Party: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
Leader: Cǎlin Popescu-Tǎriceanu
Tenure: December 2004–April 2007
Government Party: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
Leader: Cǎlin Popescu-Tǎriceanu
Tenure: April 2007–December 2008
Government Party: National Liberal
Leader: Emil Boc
Tenure: December 2009–September 2010
Government Party: National Liberal
Leader: Emil Boc
Tenure: September 2011–February 2012
Government Party: National Liberal
Leader: Mihai Rǎzvan Ungureanu
Tenure: February 2012–May 2012
Government Party: Social Liberal Union
229

Cristina Chiva, Strong Investiture Rules and Minority Governments in Romania, in PARLIAMENTS AND
GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING INVESTITURE RULES 197, 205 (BjørnRasch, Shane Martin & José Cheibub
eds., 2015).
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Leader: Victor Ponta
Tenure: May 2012–December 2012
D. Czech Republic230
Government Party: Civic Democratic; Civic Democratic Alliance; and Christian and Democratic
Union Czechoslovak People’s Party
Leader: Václav Klaus
Tenure: July 1996–January 1998
Government Party: Czech Social Democratic
Leader: Miloš Zeman
Tenure: August 1998–August 2002
III. NORDIC COUNTRIES
A. Denmark231
Government Party: Liberal
Leader: Knud Kristensen
Tenure: November 1945–October 1947
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Hans Hedtoft
Tenure: November 1947–August 1950
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Hans Hedtoft
Tenure: September 1950–October 1950
Government Party: Liberal; and Conservative
Leader: Erik Eriksen
Tenure: October 1950–April 1953
Government Party: Liberal; and Conservative
Leader: Erik Eriksen
Tenure: April 1953–September 1953
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Hans Hedtoft
Tenure: Septemer 1953–January 1955
230

The minority governments that failed to obtain parliamentary confirmation are omitted from this section. Those
governments were headed by Mirek Topolánek in October 2006 and Jiří Rusnok in August 2013. Robert Zbiral,
Changing Investiture Rules in the Czech Republic, in PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING
INVESTITURE RULES 182, 191 (Bjørn Rasch, Shane Martin & José Cheibub eds., 2015).
231
STRØM, supra note 4, at 249–50; Seyd, supra note 66, at 18–19.
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Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Hans Christian Hansen
Tenure: February 1955–May 1957
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Radical
Leader: Viggo Kampmann
Tenure: November 1960–September 1962
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Radical
Leader: Jens Otto Krag
Tenure: September 1962–September 1964
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Jens Otto Krag
Tenure: September 1964–November 1966
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Jens Otto Krag
Tenure: November 1966–January 1968
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Jens Otto Krag
Tenure: October 1971–October 1972
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Anker Jørgensen
Tenure: October 1972–December 1973
Government Party: Liberal
Leader: Poul Hartling
Tenure: December 1973–January 1975
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Anker Jørgensen
Tenure: February 1975–February 1977
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Anker Jørgensen
Tenure: February 1977–August 1978
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Liberal
Leader: Anker Jørgensen
Tenure: August 1978–September 1979
Government Party: Social Democratic
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Leader: Anker Jørgensen
Tenure: October 1979–November 1981
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Anker Jørgensen
Tenure: December 1981–September 1982
Government Party: Conservatives People’s Party; Liberal; Centre Democratic; and Christian
People’s Party
Leader: Poul Schlüter
Tenure: September 1982–January 1984
Government Party: Conservatives People’s Party; Liberal; Centre Democratic; and Christian
People’s Party
Leader: Poul Schlüter
Tenure: January 1984–September 1987
Government Party: Conservatives People’s Party; Liberal; Centre Democratic; and Christian
People’s Party
Leader: Poul Schlüter
Tenure: September 1987–May 1988
Government Party: Conservative People’s Party; Liberal; and Danish Social Liberal
Leader: Poul Schlüter
Tenure: May 1988–December 1990
Government Party: Conservative People’s Party; Liberal
Leader: Poul Schlüter
Tenure: December 1990–January 1993
Government Party: Social Democratic; Centre Democratic; and Danish Social Liberal
Leader: Poul Nyrup Rasmussen
Tenure: September 1994–December 1996
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Danish Social Liberal
Leader: Poul Nyrup Rasmussen
Tenure: December 1996–March 1998
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Danish Social Liberal
Leader: Poul Nyrup Rasmussen
Tenure: March 1998–November 2001
Government Party: Liberal; and Conservative People’s Party
Leader: Anders Fogh Rasmussen; Lars Løkke Rasmussen
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Tenure: November 2001–October 2011232
Government Party: Social Democratic; Danish Social Liberal; and Socialist People’s Party
Leader: Helle Thorning-Schmidt
Tenure: October 2011–February 2014233
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Danish Social Liberal
Leader: Helle Thorning-Schmidt
Tenure: February 2014–June 2015234
Government Party: Liberal
Leader: Lars Løkke Rasmussen
Tenure: June 2015–November 2016235
Government Party: Liberal; the Liberal Alliance; and Conservative
Leader: Lars Løkke Rasmussen
Tenure: November 2016–Present236
B. Sweden237
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Tage Erlander
Tenure: September 1948–September 1952
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Farmer’s League
Leader: Tage Erlander
Tenure: September 1956–June 1958
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Tage Erlander
Tenure: June 1958–September 1960
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Anders Fogh Rasmussen was reelected in 2005 and 2007. Gunnar Thesen, Making and Shaking Government? 2,
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Secretary General in April 2009. See Rasmussen, NATO REV. MAG.,
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233
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(Mar. 2007) (unpublished paper) (on file with Södertörns Högskola University College),
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Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Tage Erlander
Tenure: September 1960–September 1964
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Tage Erlander
Tenure: September 1964–September 1968
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Olof Palme
Tenure: September 1970–September 1973
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Olof Palme
Tenure: September 1973–September 1976
Government Party: Centre
Leader: Thorbjörn Fälldin
Tenure: October 1978–October 1979
Government Party: Center; and People’s Party
Leader: Thorbjörn Fälldin
Tenure: May 1981–September 1982
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Olof Palme
Tenure: October 1982–September 1985
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Olof Palme
Tenure: October 1985–February 1986
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Ingvar Carlsson
Tenure: March 1986–September 1988
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Ingvar Carlsson
Tenure: March 1988–September 1988
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Ingvar Carlsson
Tenure: September 1988–October 1991
Government Party: Moderate; Liberal; Christian Democratic; and Center
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Leader: Carl Bildt
Tenure: September 1991–October 1994
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Ingvar Carlsson
Tenure: September 1994–March 1996
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Göran Persson
Tenure: March 1996–September 1998
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Göran Persson
Tenure: September 1998–September 2002
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Göran Persson
Tenure: September 2002–October 2006
Government Party: Moderate; Liberal; Christian Democratic; and Center
Leader: Fredrik Reinfeldt
Tenure: October 2010–September 2014238
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Green
Leader: Stefan Löfven
Tenure: September 2014–Present239
C. Norway240
Government Party: Labor
Leader: Einar Gerhardsen
Tenure: September 1961–August 1963
Government Party: Conservative; Liberal; Christian People’s Party; and Center
Leader: John Lyng
Tenure: August 1963–September 1963
Government Party: Labor
Leader: Einar Gerhardsen
Tenure: September 1963–October 1965
238

Sweden—Politics, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Mar. 1, 2018, 6:30 PM),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/se-politics.htm.
239
The Swedish System of Government, SWEDEN.SE, https://sweden.se/society/the-swedish-system-of-government/
(last updated Jan. 18, 2018).
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STRØM, supra note 4, at 264–65; HILMAR ROMMETVEDT, THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT 26–28
(2004).
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Government Party: Labor
Leader: Trygve Brattel
Tenure: March 1971–October 1972
Government Party: Christian Democratic; Centre; and Liberal
Leader: Lars Korvald
Tenure: October 1972–October 1973
Government Party: Labor
Leader: Trygve Bratteli
Tenure: October 1973–January 1976
Government Party: Labor
Leader: Odvar Nordli
Tenure: January 1976–September 1977
Government Party: Labor
Leader: Odvar Nordli
Tenure: September 1977–January 1981
Government Party: Labor
Leader: Gro Harlem Brundtland
Tenure: February 1981–October 1981
Government Party: Conservative
Leader: Kåre Willoch
Tenure: October 1981–June 1983
Government Party: Conservative
Leader: Kåre Willoch
Tenure: September 1985–May 1986
Government Party: Labor
Leader: Gro Harlem Brundtland
Tenure: May 1986–October 1989
Government Party: Conservative; Christian Democratic; and Centre
Leader: Jan Syse
Tenure: September 1989–November 1990
Government Party: Labor
Leader: Gro Harlem Brundtland
Tenure: November 1990–October 1996
Government Party: Labor
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Leader: Thorbjørn Jagland
Tenure: October 1996–October 1997
Government Party: Christian Democratic; Conservative; Centre; and Liberal
Leader: Kjell Magne Bondevik
Tenure: October 1997–March 2000
Government Party: Labor
Leader: Jens Stoltenberg
Tenure: March 2000–October 2001241
Government Party: Conservative; Christian Democratic; and Liberal
Leader: Kjell Magne Bondevik
Tenure: October 2001–September 2005242
Government Party: Conservative; and Progressive
Leader: Erna Solberg
Tenure: September 2013–Present243
D. Finland244
Government Party: Finnish People’s Democratic Union
Leader: Karl-August Fagerholm
Tenure: July 1948–March 1950
Government Party: Center; Swedish People’s Party; and Liberal
Leader: Urho Kekkonen
Tenure: March 1950–January 1951
Government Party: Center; and Swedish People’s Party
Leader: Urho Kekkonen
Tenure: July–November 1953
Government Party: Center; Swedish People’s Party; and Liberal
Leader: Vieno Johannes Sukselainen
Tenure: May–July 1957
Government Party: Center; and Liberal
Leader: Vieno Johannes Sukselainen
Tenure: July–September 1957
241
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Government Party: Center; Liberal; and Finnish Social Democratic
Leader: Vieno Johannes Sukselainen
Tenure: September–October 1957
Government Party: Center/The Agrarian Union
Leader: Vieno Johannes Sukselainen
Tenure: January 1959–June 1961
Government Party: Center/The Agrarian Union
Leader: Martti Miettunen
Tenure: July 1961–March 1962
Government Party: Finnish People’s Democratic Union
Leader: Rafael Paasio
Tenure: February 1972–July 1972
Government Party: Center; Swedish People’s Party; and Liberal
Leader: Martti Miettunen
Tenure: September 1976–May 1977
Government Party: Finnish Social Democratic; Center; and Swedish People’s Party
Leader: Kalevi Sorsa
Tenure: December 1982–April 1983
E. Iceland245
Government Party: Independence
Leader: Ólafur Thors
Tenure: December 1949–March 1950
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Emil Jonsson
Tenure: December 1958–November 1959
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Emil Jonsson
Tenure: June–November 1959
Government Party: Social Democratic
Leader: Emil Grøndahl
Tenure: October 1979–December 1979
Government Party: Social Democratic Alliance; and Left-Green Movement
245
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Leader: Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir
Tenure: February–April 2009246
IV. OTHER COUNTRIES
A. Australia
Government Party: Labor Party
Leader: Julia Gillard
Tenure: June 2010–June 2013247
B. Canada248
Government Party: Liberal
Leader: William Lyon Mackenzie King
Tenure: June 1945–November 1948
Government Party: Progressive Conservative
Leader: John Diefenbaker
Tenure: June 1957–April 1958
Government Party: Progressive Conservative
Leader: John Diefenbaker
Tenure: June 1962–April 1963
Government Party: Liberal
Leader: Lester Pearson
Tenure: April 1963–December 1965
Government Party: Liberal
Leader: Lester Pearson
Tenure: December 1965–April 1968
Government Party: Liberal
Leader: Pierre Trudeau
Tenure: April–July 1968
Government Party: Liberal
Leader: Pierre Trudeau
Tenure: November 1972–May 1974
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Government Party: Progressive Conservative
Leader: Joe Clark
Tenure: June 1979–March 1980
Government Party: Liberal
Leader: Paul Martin
Tenure: June 2004–January 2006249
Government Party: Conservative
Leader: Stephen Harper
Tenure: January 2006–September 2008250
Government Party: Conservative
Leader: Stephen Harper
Tenure: October 2008251–May 2011252
C. New Zealand253
Government Party: National
Leader: Jim Bolger
Tenure: June 1995–October 1996
Government Party: National; and United New Zealand
Leader: Jim Bolger
Tenure: October 1996254
Government Party: National; and Independent
Leader: Jenny Shipley
Tenure: October 1998–December 1999
Government Party: Labour; and Alliance Progressive
Leader: Helen Clark
Tenure: December 1999–July 2002
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Government Party: Labour; and Conservative
Leader: Helen Clark
Tenure: July 2002–September 2005
Government Party: Labour; and Conservative
Leader: Helen Clark
Tenure: September 2005–November 2008
Government Party: National
Leader: John Key
Tenure: November 2008–November 2011
Government Party: National
Leader: John Key
Tenure: November 2011–September 2014
Government Party: National
Leader: John Key; Bill English
Tenure: September 2014 – Present255
D. India256
Government Party: Secular; People’s Party; and Supreme Akali
Leader: Chaudhary Charan Singh
Tenure: July 1979–August 1979
Government Party: Secular; All India Anna Dravidian Progress Federation; Party of Telugu
Land; and Indian National Congress
Leader: Vishwanath Pratap Singh
Tenure: December 1989–November 1990
Government Party: Indian People’s Party; Army of Shivaji; and Supreme Akali
Leader: Atal Behari Vajpayee
Tenure: May 1996
Government Party: People’s Party; Trinamool Congress; Socialist, Dravidian Progress
Federation; Party of Telugu Land, Communist; Assam Peoples Association; and
Maharashtrawadi Gomantak
Leader: H.D. Deve Godwa
Tenure: June 1996–April 1997
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256
Sridharan, supra note 136, at 320–25.

55

Government Party: People’s Party; Trinamool Congress; Socialist; Dravidian Progress
Federation; Party of Telugu Land; Communist; Assam Peoples Association; and
Maharashtrawadi Gomantak
Leader: Inder Kumar Gujral
Tenure: April 1997–November 1997
Government Party: Arunachal Congress; Indian People’s Party; Biju Janata Dal; Pattali Makkal
Katchi; Army of Shivaji; and All India Anna Dravidian Progress Federation
Leader: Atal Behari Vajpayee
Tenure: March 1998–April 1999
Government Party: National Congress; Indian Union Muslim League; Pattali Makkal Katchi;
Dravidar Organization; Jharkhand Liberation Front; Telangana Rashtra Samithi; and National
People’s Party
Leader: Manmohan Singh
Tenure: May 2004–March 2009
Government Party: Indian National Congress; Dravidian Progress Federation; Nationalist
Congress; and Indian Union Muslim League
Leader: Manmohan Singh
Tenure: May 2009–May 2014
E. Israel257
Government Party: Likud; National Religious; and Peace for Zion
Leader: Manachem Begin
Tenure: June 1977–October 1977
Government Party: Likud; National Religious; and Movement for Israel’s Tradition
Leader: Manachem Begin
Tenure: August 1981–September 1983
Government Party: Likud; National Religious; and Movement for Israel’s Tradition
Leader: Manachem Begin
Tenure: October 1983–July 1984
Government Party: Labor; Vigour; and Shas258
Leader: Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres259
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Tenure: July 1992–November 1995
F. Japan
Government Party: Democratic
Leader: Tsutomu Hata
Tenure: April 1994–June 1994260
Government Party: Liberal Democratic
Leader: Ryutaro Hashimoto
Tenure: October 1996–July 1998261
G. Taiwan262
Government Party: Democratic Progressive
Leader: Chen Shui-bian (President)
Tenure: 2000–2008
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